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Non‐technical Summary 
The  present  study  compares  exchange  rate  expectations  of  “chartists“  and  “fundamentalists.“ 
“Chartists” are those financial market participants who base their forecasts and actions on past price 
movements  of  their  asset  (here:  a  currency).  “Fundamentalists,”  on  the  other  hand,  are  financial 
market participants who base their forecasts and actions on economic models. 
Various  studies  give  empirical  evidence  for  the  presence  of  chartists  and  fundamentalists  in  FX 
markets.  Expectation  formation  of  exchange  rate  forecasters  per  se  has  also  been  studied  from 
various perspectives in the literature. Our study, however, goes beyond previous research, as it is the 
first  to explicitly  connect  the  two  strands of  literature: how exactly do professional analysts, who 
claim to be either chartists or fundamentalists, make their respective exchange rate forecasts? 
Our  study  is  divided  into  three  parts.  In  a  first  step,  we  analyze  chartists’  and  fundamentalists’ 
forecast behavior. Models  including chartists and  fundamentalists often make specific assumptions 
about these two groups. Our research can help verify these assumptions. In a second step, we model 
forecast dynamics caused by changes  in forecasting strategies and  identify the factors motivating a 
change  in strategy. Theoretical models with chartists and fundamentalists suppose that chartists do 
not systematically perform worse than fundamentalists (as would be expected in efficient markets). 
Therefore,  in a  third step, we  investigate  forecasting performance,  i.e. whether chartists’  forecasts 
may be used as the basis for profitable trading strategies in the same manner as fundamentalists’. 
In order to address this question, we combine two data sets. One is a set of micro data consisting of 
monthly USD/EUR forecasts made by professional analysts starting with the introduction of the Euro. 
Our  second  data  set  comprises  information  on  the  self‐assessment  of  almost  400  of  these 
professional analysts, i.e., on the degree to which they claim to rely on fundamental analysis or chart 
analysis to make their forecasts. The combination of the two data sets allows us to put analysts’ self‐
assessment  and  their  actual  forecasts  into  context.  Our  panel  comprises  more  than  30,000 
observations over the course of 153 months. 
Our  results confirm  relevant assumptions made  in chartist‐fundamentalist models: Chartists  follow 
trends more  often  than  fundamentalists  and  change  the  direction  of  their  forecasts more  often. 
However,  there  are  strong  influencing  factors which  alter both  groups’  forecasts,  such  as  a  great 
deviation from the long‐term fundamental value. Also having experienced a strong trend in the past 
increases all  forecasters’  tendency  to base  forecasts on  trends.  It  should  finally be noted  that  the 
quality of  chartists’  forecasts  is not  inferior  to  that of  fundamentalists’  forecasts. On a  short‐term 
horizon, chartists’ forecasts even appear to be more accurate than those of fundamentalists. 
Nicht‐technische Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Untersuchung befasst sich mit den Wechselkurserwartungen von „Chartisten“ und 
„Fundamentalisten“  im Vergleich. Als  „Chartisten“  bezeichnet man  allgemein  Finanzmarktakteure, 
die aus dem vergangenen Preisverlauf  ihres Anlageobjektes  (hier: einer Währung) Rückschlüsse  für 
ihre Handelsentscheidungen oder Prognosen ziehen. Als „Fundamentalisten“ versteht man hingegen 
Finanzmarktakteure, die Handelsentscheidungen oder Prognosen auf ökonomische Modelle stützen. 
Eine  Reihe  von  Studien  belegt  die  Präsenz  von  Chartisten  und  Fundamentalisten  auf 
Währungsmärkten empirisch. Auch die Erwartungsbildung von Wechselkursprognosen als solche  ist 
in der Vergangenheit verschiedentlich  in der Literatur untersucht worden. Unser Beitrag geht über 
die  bisherigen  Studien  hinaus,  indem  er  die  beiden  genannten  Literaturstränge  erstmals  explizit 
verknüpft: Wie genau formen professionelle Analysten, die sich aufgrund ihrer eigenen Angaben als 
Chartisten bzw. Fundamentalisten einordnen lassen, jeweils ihre Wechselkurserwartungen?  
Wir  gliedern  unsere  Untersuchung  in  drei  Teile.  In  einem  ersten  Schritt  untersuchen  wir  das 
Vorhersageverhalten  von  Chartisten  und  Fundamentalisten.  Modelle  mit  Chartisten  und 
Fundamentalisten  treffen häufig  spezifische Annahmen über diese Gruppen. Unsere Untersuchung 
kann dazu beitragen, diese Annahmen zu überprüfen.  In einem zweiten Schritt modellieren wir die 
Vorhersagedynamik  durch  den  Wechsel  zwischen  unterschiedlichen  Prognosestrategien,  und 
überprüfen, welche Faktoren den Wechsel begünstigen. In einem dritten Schritt untersuchen wir die 
Vorhersagequalität von Chartisten und Fundamentalisten. Theoretische Modelle mit Chartisten und 
Fundamentalisten  unterstellen,  dass  Chartisten  nicht  (wie  es  in  effizienten  Märkten  zu  erwarten 
wäre) systematisch schlechter abschneiden als Fundamentalisten. Wir untersuchen deswegen, ob die 
Erwartungen  von  Chartisten  gleichermaßen  wie  die  von  Fundamentalisten  als  Grundlage  für 
profitable Handelsstrategien verwendet werden können.  
Um dieser Fragestellung nachzugehen, verknüpfen wir zwei Datensätze: Zum einen verfügen wir über 
einen  Mikrodatensatz  mit  monatlichen  USD/EUR‐Prognosen  von  professionellen  Analysten  seit 
Einführung des Euro. Zum anderen liegt uns für knapp 400 dieser Analysten eine Information darüber 
vor,  wie  stark  sie  –nach  Selbsteinschätzung‐  Fundamentalanalyse  bzw.  Chartanalyse  für  ihre 
Wechselkursprognosen  verwenden.  Beide  Datensätze  zusammen  erlauben  es  somit,  die 
Selbsteinschätzung  der  Analysten  und  ihre  tatsächlichen  Prognosen  im  Kontext  zu  untersuchen. 
Insgesamt betrachten wir ein Panel von mehr als 30.000 Beobachtungen über 153 Monate. 
Unsere Ergebnisse bestätigen wesentliche Annahmen, die  in Chartisten‐Fundamentalisten‐Modellen 
gemacht werden: Chartisten  folgen häufiger Trends als Fundamentalisten und ändern häufiger die 
Richtung  ihrer  Vorhersage.  Gleichwohl  gibt  es  starke  Einflussgrößen,  die  die  Erwartungen  beider 
Gruppen verändern, wie etwa  starke Abweichungen vom  langfristigen Fundamentalwert. Auch die 
„Erfahrung“  eines  starken  Trends  in  der  Vergangenheit  führt  zu  einer  größeren  Neigung  aller 
Prognostiker,  ihre  Vorhersagen  am  Trend  zu  orientieren.  Nicht  zuletzt  ist  festzuhalten,  dass  die 
Qualität der Prognosen von Chartisten nicht schlechter  ist als die von Fundamentalisten; auf kurze 
Horizonte erscheinen die Prognosen von Chartisten sogar denen von Fundamentalisten überlegen. 
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Exchange rate expectations of chartists and fundamentalists
Abstract
This paper provides novel evidence on exchange rate expectations of both chartists and fun-
damentalists separately. These groups indeed form expectations differently. Chartists change
their expectations more often; however, all professionals’ expectations vary considerably as they
generally follow strong exchange rate trends. In line with non-linear exchange rate-modeling,
professionals expect mean reversion only if exchange rates deviate much from PPP. Chartists
survive in FX markets as they forecast equally accurately as fundamentalists. Unexpected
from an efficient market viewpoint, chartists even outperform fundamentalists at short hori-
zons. Overall, these findings clearly support the chartist-fundamentalist approach.
JEL-Classification: F31, G15, D84.
Keywords: exchange rate formation, expectation formation, heterogeneous agent models,
forecasting performance
1 Introduction
There is ample research about the way exchange rate expectations are formed, stimulated in
particular by Frankel and Froot (1987). There is also a great number of studies systematically
documenting characteristics of chartists and fundamentalists in foreign exchange, starting with
Taylor and Allen (1992). However, until today there has been no direct evidence combining these
two strands of literature: How do professionals, who state to be chartists or fundamentalists, each
form their exchange rate expectations?
This is an important question from at least three perspectives. First, the so-called chartist-
fundamentalist models of exchange rates make assumptions about the behavior of these two groups
(e.g., Frankel and Froot, 1990; Manzan and Westerhoff, 2007; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006).
We examine whether chartists and fundamentalists really behave as they are assumed to do in this
line of research. Second, models of heterogeneous agents have been shown to be able to replicate
the characteristics of instable financial markets (Day and Huang, 1990; Farmer and Joshi, 2002).
These models argue that instability arises from the expectation formation of a non-fundamentally-
oriented group of traders, a notion which corresponds to our group of chartists. Hence, we examine
whether the decision making of this group contributes to financial instability. Third, the existence
of various groups in financial markets implicitly assumes that all these groups operate successfully
in the long run. The efficient market hypothesis has stated in this respect that chartism-inspired
behavior will not be competitive in the longer run (Fama, 1991). To complement the abundance
of studies testing the profitability of hypothetical chartist trading rules (e.g., Park and Irwin,
2007; Neely, Weller, and Ulrich, 2010), we examine whether actual expectations of chartists and
fundamentalists each provide a basis for profitable trading strategies.
All examinations presented here are the first to systematically connect information about indi-
vidual exchange rate expectations with the respective professionals’ preferred kind of information,
i.e. charts or fundamentals. This connection enables us to directly test the real world behavior
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of chartists and fundamentalists and thus to complement existing indirect evidence derived from
simulation studies (e.g., Fo¨llmer, Horst, and Kirman, 2005; Tramontana, Westerhoff, and Gardini,
2010), experiments (Sonnemans, Hommes, Tuinstra, and Van De Velden, 2004) or explanations of
forecast dispersion (Jongen, Verschoor, Wolff, and Zwinkels, 2012). Our findings clearly support
the common core of the chartist-fundamentalist models: forecasters who rely heavily on charts do
indeed form exchange rate expectations more in line with trends than fundamentalists and they
reinforce existing trends, which may destabilize foreign exchange markets. Finally, challenging the
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1991, 1998), chartist behavior is individually rational as these
forecasts are at least as good as those of the peer group.
This study rests on the Financial Market Survey conducted on a monthly basis by the Centre
for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany, among several hundred profes-
sional forecasters. This survey regularly asks professionals about their individual US-dollar / Euro
expectations, starting in January 1999. We combine these answers with information about the
respective individuals’ self-assessment of the use of charts and fundamentals, which has been asked
three times, i.e., in 2004, 2007 and 2011. Overall, our sample comprises almost 400 forecasters
which provide an unbalanced panel with more than 30,000 observations over up to 153 months,
until September 2011. We classify forecasters into the categories of chartists, fundamentalists, and
the remaining one which we call intermediates.
Our study makes use of these data in three steps, analyzing actual forecasting behavior, fore-
casting dynamics and forecasting performance: (1) Regarding forecasting behavior, we test the
revealed behavior of chartists and fundamentalists, as inspired by chartist-fundamentalist models.
In line with earlier literature (e.g., Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007), we use the terms of charts and
technical analysis as synonyms. We find that chartists tend to follow trends more frequently than
fundamentalists. (2) Regarding forecasting dynamics, chartists tend to revise the direction of their
exchange rate forecasts more frequently than fundamentalists, confirming a frequent assumption
in heterogeneous agents’ models (e.g., Brock and Hommes, 1998; Farmer and Joshi, 2002). The
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choice of forecasting tools is influenced by recent experience: when exchange rates exhibit trends,
the professionals (chartists and fundamentalists) tend to switch towards chartism; in contrast, the
professionals move away from chartism when the exchange rate deviates substantially from its
longer-term average (the purchasing power parity, PPP). (3) Regarding forecasting performance,
professionals, such as chartists, will only survive in competitive foreign exchange markets if they
perform. We find that chartists are indeed equally good forecasters as fundamentalists. When
differentiating between forecasting horizons chartists perform relatively better at shorter horizons,
whereas fundamentalists are at least equally good at longer horizons, which nicely fits the preferred
short (long) horizon of chartists (fundamentalists) (Taylor and Allen, 1992).
All these findings conform with the core assumptions of chartist-fundamentalist models or with
the stylized facts about expectation formation and the use of charts and fundamentals, respectively.
Detailed references to this literature are discussed in the following Section 2. In this sense, we
provide supportive evidence complementing earlier approaches, which often relied on indirect tests.
In detail, however, we also obtain evidence that is less conclusive with some specific assumptions.
The most important issue in this respect seems to be our intuition that the switching between
chartism and fundamentalism is largely an opportunistic shift of weight that forecasters give to
these tools (different from De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006; Manzan and Westerhoff, 2007), whereas
their general preferences for either charts or fundamentals seem to be quite stable over time.
Moreover, chartists are neither less profitable than fundamentalists as modeled by Day and Huang
(1990), nor more profitable as modeled by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006, p.29), and switching
between strategies is not related to exchange rate volatility (ibid, p.26).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses relevant literature in order to
embed our study in earlier work and to carve out our own contribution. Section 3 reports the
comprehensive dataset. Section 4 presents results of our research in several steps (Sections 4.1 to
4.3), Section 5 contains robustness tests. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.
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2 Literature and hypotheses
This section shows the relation of our research to various strands of earlier literature, which we can
cover only selectively. There are studies about exchange rate expectation formation and the use of
charts and fundamentals which have heavily influenced the chartist-fundamentalist models. More
generally, studies modeling the interaction of heterogeneous agents often focus on the forecasting
dynamics of groups, which may lead to an instability of prices. Finally, our work is related to
studies about the performance of chartist and fundamentalist trading.
Exchange rate expectation formation. In the standard economic models about exchange
rate formation, representative agents perfectly understand macroeconomic fundamentals so that
the present price always and fully reflects the available information. The empirical test of such
models shows, however, that these stylized rational expectations models seem to be too stylized
to adequately explain exchange rate formation (e.g., Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Cheung, Chinn, and
Garcia-Pascual, 2005). A useful starting point to explain the existence of such a gap between
models and reality is the high degree of heterogeneity among foreign exchange professionals, which
has been found in seminal studies by Frankel and Froot (1990) or Ito (1990) and has later been
reconfirmed by, e.g., MacDonald and Marsh (1996).
While heterogeneity as such is not a problem for models with representative agents, the het-
erogeneity in foreign exchange does not seem to be normally distributed. Instead, several kinds of
patterns in heterogeneity have been revealed over the years, some of which are of interest for our
research. In one of the first studies examining exchange rate expectations, Frankel and Froot (1987)
state that the formation of exchange rates follows bandwagon expectations over short horizons and
regressive expectations over longer horizons. This finding already contains the core ingredient of
chartist-fundamentalist models, i.e. the co-existence of trend-following and mean-reverting expec-
tations. This core insight has been steadily confirmed and refined in later studies (for surveys,
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see MacDonald (2000) or Jongen, Verschoor, and Wolff (2008)), e.g., by considering the fact that
forecasters rely on mean-reversion in a non-linear fashion (e.g., Menkhoff, Rebitzky, and Schro¨der,
2008; Reitz, Ru¨lke, and Stadtmann, 2012), an aspect we also consider in this study.
Use of charts and fundamentals. Another line of research initiated by Taylor and Allen
(1992) has explicitly asked foreign exchange dealers about their use of technical and fundamental
analysis when forecasting exchange rates. Dealers state that they indeed mostly use both kinds
of analysis, but that they use charts at shorter horizons than fundamentals. This result has also
been replicated in many studies and could be extended to fund managers (see survey by Menkhoff
and Taylor, 2007).
Chartist-fundamentalist models. All this provides clear motivation to model foreign exchange
markets where both, chartists and fundamentalist, co-exist and interact. An early version of such
a chartist-fundamentalist model has been formulated by Frankel and Froot (1990) and has been
much refined by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). The basic idea is that there are two groups in the
market, i.e. chartists and fundamentalists, who follow different investment strategies. Chartists
usually dominate the market with their trend-following behavior, which generates its own kind of
risk for fundamentalists. When, however, exchange rate misalignment becomes more and more
obvious, the relative attractiveness of fundamentalism increases and more market participants
follow fundamentals. This mechanism limits the power of chartism and reduces the deviation of
exchange rates from their fundamental equilibrium rate; this also provides a motivation for foreign
exchange interventions (e.g., Beine, De Grauwe, and Grimaldi, 2009). As long as exchange rates
are not obviously misaligned such that there is less certainty about their true fundamental rate,
chartists are relatively stronger. It should be noted that De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) define
chartists as being ignorant of fundamental information. In contrast, Manzan and Westerhoff (2007)
assume, for instance, that both groups are equally informed about fundamental information, but
that only chartists consider technical analysis to also be relevant, whereas fundamentalists do not.
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We use the results discussed so far as guiding hypotheses for our research. Complementing
earlier evidence, we demonstrate that the professional forecasters’ self-assessment regarding their
forecasting tools enables us to classify them as chartists, fundamentalists, or intermediates.
Next, we test whether chartists’ and fundamentalists’ forecasting behavior does differ as ex-
pected. As a common core chartist-fundamentalist models often assume that chartists base their
forecasts on prevailing market trends by following these trends. In reality, however, there is a large
variety of ways to construct a technical trading rule (see, e.g. Neely and Weller, 2011) so that the
focus on trend-following strategies is less than obvious. As a consequence, we investigate whether
chartists can in fact be characterized by a strong use of trend-following strategies which is, in
particular, stronger than for fundamentalists (Hypothesis 1 ). In order to quantify trend-following
we rely on simple momentum rules, although we acknowledge that trend-extrapolation could be
done in more sophisticated ways in reality, as experimental evidence suggests (Ro¨theli, 2011).
The characterization of chartists needs to be complemented by a characterization of fundamen-
talists. Fundamental models basically assume a mean reverting forecasting behavior, such that
a long-run moving average indicating purchasing power parity provides the hypothetical mean.
Thus, we investigate whether the orientation at PPP is more pronounced for fundamentalists (Hy-
pothesis 2 ). This hypothesis has been tested in a related fashion for an earlier sample of the ZEW
data with a supportive result (Menkhoff, Rebitzky, and Schro¨der, 2008). However, this earlier
paper has only used information about the use of more or less fundamental information, but did
not examine chartists as an own category in comparison.
Heterogeneous agents’ models. A core element of chartist-fundamentalist models in foreign
exchange is the dynamics between groups. Several mechanisms have been suggested for these dy-
namics in the heterogeneous agents’ literature. Some models rely on segmented investors, such
as sophisticated α-investors and purely trend-following β-investors introduced by Day and Huang
(1990), such as Chiarella, Dieci, and Gardini (2002), or segmented markets, such as in Wester-
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hoff (2004). The results of these simulation studies are largely consistent with highly stylized
facts of financial markets and observations in experimental asset markets, where, usually, students
form expectations about future asset prices and operate in a dynamic market setting (see, e.g.,
Sonnemans, Hommes, Tuinstra, and Van De Velden, 2004; Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair, 2007;
Bloomfield, Tayler, and Zhou, 2009; Hommes, 2011). Results are also consistent with models
from behavioral finance, such as Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), where investors believe in
two states of the world, i.e. a trend regime and a mean-reverting regime. Finally, heterogeneous
agents have been linked to the dispersion of expectations in foreign exchange. Menkhoff, Reb-
itzky, and Schro¨der (2009) demonstrate in a somewhat abstract framework that switching between
chartists and fundamentalist positions may explain forecast dispersion. Jongen, Verschoor, Wolff,
and Zwinkels (2012) show in more detail how the switching between a chartist, a fundamentalist
and a carry trade position can explain expectation dispersion.
In particular Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) model a switching mechanism: agents alter their
strategy when they realize that an alternative strategy has performed better than their original one.
In the field of exchange rate modeling, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) incorporate the notion by
Brock and Hommes (1997) that switching between chartists and fundamentalists occurs through
the comparison of ex post profits. This has been applied to exchange rate expectations by Jongen,
Verschoor, Wolff, and Zwinkels (2012). In contrast, Lux (1998) allows both the comparison of ex
post profitability as well as contagion to induce switching between different trading rules. A third
explanation for switching between strategies is given by Dieci and Westerhoff (2010), who assume
that all traders are familiar with both technical and fundamental trading rules, and opt for one of
them based on the expected future performance rather than the ex post performance. According
to this view, the agents tend to move from chartist to fundamental strategies when the deviation
between fundamental value and exchange rate becomes large.
These models provide further testable hypotheses. First, various heterogeneous agents’ models
assume that the existence of non-fundamentally-driven behavior of a group of agents introduces
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instability to the respective system, in our case the exchange rate (e.g., Brock and Hommes, 1998;
Farmer and Joshi, 2002); this idea has already been formalized earlier by, e.g., DeLong, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waldmann (1989), albeit in a different way. A source of instability is these agents’
willingness to often switch their positions. Applied to our case, one would expect that chartists
show instable behavior by switching between appreciation and depreciation expectations (moti-
vating long and short positions in a currency) more frequently than fundamentalists (Hypothesis
3 ). Regarding the concrete motivation for switching, the concept by Brock and Hommes (1997)
suggests that agents evaluate alternative strategies on the basis of their ex-post profitability. Ac-
cordingly, Lux (1998) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) propose that chartist trading rules are
adopted when momentum trading has been profitable in the preceding period (Hypothesis 4 ).
In a somewhat forward-looking modification of this rule, it is often assumed that the influence
of fundamentalism increases when the exchange rate deviates more clearly from its fundamental
equilibrium (e.g., Bauer, De Grauwe, and Reitz, 2009). In line with recent empirical exchange rate
modeling, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) introduce transaction costs to incorporate a non-linear
response of exchange rates to changes in fundamentals (e.g. Dumas, 1993; Taylor, Peel, and Sarno,
2001; Kilian and Taylor, 2003). This implies that a greater deviation from the fundamental value
decreases the perceived risk of following a fundamental strategy, and the switching mechanism in
this model induces a shift from chartist to fundamentalist strategies (Hypothesis 5 ).
Performance of chartist trading. Independently of these research issues, there is a continuous
line of studies examining the profitability of chartist trading in foreign exchange. Profitability is a
crucial issue because it justifies the existence of chartists in competitive financial markets. Since
the 1970s many studies have found that simple trading rules applied to a set of exchange rates
seem to generate considerable excess returns. This main result has been confirmed by later studies
which extend the analysis to different forms of technical analysis and to various methodological
refinements (e.g. Okunev and White, 2003; Qi and Wu, 2006; Park and Irwin, 2007; Neely, Weller,
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and Ulrich, 2010).
A shortcoming of these studies in assessing chartists’ performance is that they can only an-
alyze simulated trading rules and do not calculate real-world returns. Another shortcoming is
that a comparative analysis of forecasting performance by chartists and fundamentalists has been
neglected almost completely by previous empirical studies. An exception is Goodman (1979), who
finds favorable results for chartists, although for a small sample. This lack of consideration in em-
pirical research is surprising, as theoretical models disagree about whether chartists are superior
or inferior to fundamentalists: earlier heterogeneous models, such as Day and Huang (1990) tend
to model the non-fundamental traders in a way that they call ”buy high and sell low”, i.e., these
traders lose money until they learn how fundamental strategies work. De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2006), in contrast, suggest that chartists are generally more profitable than fundamentalists. Ulti-
mately, the performance of forecasts based on chartist and fundamental information as well as their
profitability is an empirical issue. In functioning markets professionals should only consider useful
information such that neither chartists nor fundamentalists should be systematically superior, an
idea we will analyze on the basis of our data (Hypothesis 6 ).
However, there are two caveats to be made: first, in some analyses we seemingly reduce chartism
to momentum trading which is, of course, not the same. The difference may be important in our
study, because we cover the major exchange rates over the last decade, i.e. a case where earlier
studies show that simple momentum trading does not work profitably (Pukthuanthong, Levich, and
Thomas III, 2007; Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf, 2012). Second, it seems interesting
to control results for the attractively high returns from carry trades (see survey by Burnside, 2011).
On the one hand carry trading may be seen as a form of ”chartism” in the sense of mechanically
conditioning investment decisions on interest rates. On the other hand chartists may be expected
to execute not only carry trades but to (also) follow different considerations.
Overall, we examine six hypotheses derived from a rich literature. The starting assumption
on the existence of chartists and fundamentalists only provides the ground for our research. Hy-
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potheses 1 and 2 analyze forecasting behavior, Hypotheses 3 to 5 analyze forecasting dynamics
and Hypothesis 6 addresses forecasting performance. Hypotheses 2 and 6 have been tested before
with smaller samples; regrading the remaining hypotheses, our study enters new ground.
3 Data
We consider a unique panel of individual exchange rate forecasts made by almost 400 German
professional forecasters contributing to the Financial Market Survey by the Centre for European
Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, Germany. Due to its length (monthly observations
starting in 1991) and broadness (an average of about 300 forecasters respond each month), the
database has been used for recent empirical research (e.g., Schmeling and Schrimpf, 2011).
Microdata of the USD/EUR forecast. The data are particularly interesting for our research
questions as we are able to connect the forecasts to additional information on the preferred FX
forecasting tools of as many as 396 of the participating professional forecasters. We are not only
able to follow an individual forecaster’s expectations with respect to the USD/EUR rate over
time, but we are also able to link these expectations to the forecaster’s stated use of fundamental
analysis, technical analysis and the analysis of order flows, respectively. This kind of information
has been surveyed at three different points in time, i.e. in 2004.01, 2007.04 and 2011.09, and a part
of the forecasters has responded to more than one of these special surveys. For our analysis, we
focus on the USD/EUR forecasts after the introduction of the Euro in 1999.01, and we generally
consider only those forecasters from whom we have collected additional information on forecasting
tools. Thus, we analyze a panel consisting of a total of 33,861 observations from 153 months (until
2011.09). Some robustness checks are based on the entire panel of forecasters during this time
period, which comprises 744 forecasters and a total of 44,950 observations. We do not consider
forecasters who have responded to the survey less than 10 times.
The exchange rate forecasts are of directional nature, i.e. we have information on whether a
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forecaster expects the USD to appreciate, remain constant or depreciate against the Euro. Each
forecast is associated with a time stamp indicating the exact day on which the forecast was made.
This allows us to track the circumstances (such as prevailing trends) around each forecast.
The use of charts by forecasters. The special surveys in 2004.01, 2007.04 and 2011.09 ask the
forecasters to attach percentage figures to their use of fundamental analysis, technical analysis and
the analysis of order flows. Table 1 summarizes the cross sectional means and standard deviations
of the answers to this question.
[Table 1 about here]
The table reveals that, on average, the proportion of the analytical tools remains relatively
constant. Analysts attribute an average share of almost sixty percent to fundamental analysis, and
below thirty percent to technical analysis. Over the years, the importance of order flow analysis
for exchange rate forecasting appears to increase slightly, although it remains minor compared to
the other sources. Hence, we concentrate on fundamental and technical analysis in the remainder
of this paper.
These responses can be directly compared to those reported in Menkhoff and Taylor (2007,
Table 3) as the identical survey question has been applied. The foreign exchange dealers, who are
also located in Germany (and Austria), give charts a weight of 35 percent to 45 percent, whereas
international fund managers give a weight of 36 percent to 37 percent. These figures are markedly
higher than for our sample of professional forecasters with 27 percent to 30 percent, although the
difference between our analysts and the fund managers is not very large. Accordingly, the weight
of fundamentals is much higher in our sample, in particular compared to dealers.
Chartists and fundamentalists. In particular, we make use of the information given in the
special surveys to form groups of fundamentalists and chartists, respectively. For the choice of
our groups, we take into account that most forecasters indicate to apply both fundamental and
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technical analysis for their forecasts at least to some extent, while fundamental analysis dominates
in quantitative terms for the majority of forecasters. To obtain groups of forecasters with diverging
forecasting techniques, we define the two groups in a pragmatic way reflecting the kind of data
they use. There are two criteria forecasters need to meet in order to be classified as chartists: first,
they give a relatively larger weight to technical analysis than to fundamental analysis (or order flow
analysis), and second, their weight of technical analysis is at least at the 40 percent level. In order
to obtain groups of similar size and thus to make the distinction clear, we define fundamentalists
as forecasters who give a weight of at least 80 percent to fundamental analysis. The remaining
forecasters are called intermediates, but we realize that their forecasting behavior will be largely
characterized by reliance on fundamentals. For those forecasters who have responded to the special
questions more than once, we compute the average response.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 2 shows that our chosen groups of forecasters represent a relatively sharp selection: only
60 and 65 forecasters are classified as chartists and fundamentalists, respectively, while the large
majority of the total of 396 forecasters, i.e. 271 persons, is classified as intermediate. The fun-
damentalists only attach a weight of below 8 percent to chartist strategies, which is much lower
than the 56 percent stated by chartists. In contrast, the group of chartists attaches an average
weight of 30 percent to fundamental information, which is much lower than the fundamentalists’
89 percent. Hence, the two groups, fundamentalists and chartists, differ substantially in terms of
the used forecasting methods, while the group of intermediates comprises all remaining forecast-
ers. Overall, the data support the existence of chartists and fundamentalists, and thus the basic
assumption motivating this research.
Note the asymmetry between chartists’ and fundamentalists’ use of the other group’s forecasting
technique: the group of chartists makes substantial use of fundamental information, while the group
of fundamentalists does not equivalently use technical information. This result follows mainly
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from our definition of the two groups, which is asymmetric, and should not be interpreted as a
particular group behavior. In this sense, these findings are consistent with Manzan and Westerhoff
(2007) who postulate that both fundamentalists and chartists share fundamental information,
whereas De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) assume that chartists do not have any insights into
fundamental behavior. However, our results indicate that most professionals also believe that
there is information in technical analysis, not just chartists as supposed by Manzan and Westerhoff
(2007).
Persistence and representativeness. A final issue in the data section is data reliability. Since
professionals are asked three times about the analytical tools they use to forecast exchange rates,
we can compare each individual’s persistence in answers. The respective Panels A and B in Table
3 show that the broad majority of respondents continues to use the tools they had used before.
Over a period of four and a half years covered by Panel A, 91 of 135 respondents are classified on
the diagonal, i.e. 67 percent stay within the same group. Even more revealing may be the fact
that only 1 out of 38 chartists and fundamentalists switches positions. The numbers are slightly
less advantageous over the seven-year period covered by Panel B (i.e., 62 percent and 3 out of
43). These observations strongly indicate that the classification into chartists and fundamentalists
is quite persistent at the individual level, even though professionals adjust weights between their
analytical tools over time.
[Table 3 about here]
Furthermore, the considered set of forecasters (those who have provided us with a self-assessment
of preferred forecasting tools at the special surveys) is representative of the entire set of forecast-
ers in terms of their predictions: as Table 4 demonstrates, the average percentage shares of the
considered forecasters predicting an appreciation, no-change, or a depreciation is very similar to
the respective percentage shares of all forecasters, with deviations amounting to only 1 to 1.5 per-
centage points. In addition, the proportions measured for our panelists on the one hand and for
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the entire set of forecasters on the other are also highly correlated (ρ > 0.95) when compared over
time.
[Table 4 about here]
Exchange rates and inflation data. We use the USD/EUR exchange based on the exchange
rate XUDLERD issued by the Bank of England with daily frequency. This time series has the
advantage of also comprising a synthetically-computed exchange rate for the time before 1999.01,
which we need, e.g., for the computation of long-run averages. We replace missing exchange
rates (e.g. from weekends) with those recorded on the preceding trading day. When computing
the profits from trading rules involving both spot and forward rates, we use data from Thomson
Financial Datastream.1 Where needed, we consider the Consumer Price Index in the Eurozone
and the United States obtained from Datastream.2
4 Empirical results
This section documents examination results about exchange rate expectations of chartists and
fundamentalists in three steps. First, we show results on forecasting behavior (Section 4.1), then
results on forecasting dynamics (Section 4.2) and finally results on forecasting performance (Section
4.3).
4.1 Results on forecasting behavior
We make use of the professionals’ self-assessment to compare the observed behavior of chartists
and fundamentalists; for each of these groups, we analyze the role of trend-following behavior as
well as PPP orientation.
1Datastream Mnemonics: TDEUR1F, TDEUR2F, TDEUR6F, TDEUR1Y, TDEUR2Y, TDEUR3Y, TEUSDSP.
2Datastream Mnemonics: USCONPRCE, EMCONPRCF.
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Trend-following behavior. Virtually all chartist-fundamentalist models define chartists as be-
ing primarily trend-followers. In this paragraph, we investigate whether chartists’ predictions tend
to be more in line with trend-following strategies compared to those made by fundamentalists (see
our Hypothesis 1 ). Our results confirm this conjecture.
In particular, we consider a set of simple momentum-based strategies according to which fore-
casters could extrapolate a prevailing trend (over the past 10, 30, 60, 90 and 180 days) to make
a forecast. These rules predict a further appreciation (depreciation) of the USD if the USD has
gained (lost) value compared to the EUR in the past DD days, i.e.
E[∆st,t+h] = φ
(k,DD)∆st−DD,t with φ(k,DD) > 0. (1)
As we know from Section 3 that chartists also use fundamental prediction tools in addition to
chartist rules, it is unlikely that their forecasts correspond to those from Eq. (1) at all time. Com-
pared to fundamentalists’ predictions, however, one could still expect a higher level of association
of chartists’ predictions and trend-following behavior. To analyze this, we summarize the degree to
which the FX forecasts of an individual forecaster i are in line with chartist behavior by computing
the percentage share of forecasts by forecaster i made into the same direction as the forecast made
according to Eq. (1), i.e.
SHAREDDi =
number of forecasts by i in line with trend-following strategy
number of all forecasts by i
(2)
where DD captures the number of days for which a potential trend is measured. A share of unity
indicates that a forecaster’s predictions are in all time periods in line with a forecasting rule which
extrapolates the trend over the previous DD days. Hence, SHAREDDi represents a measure of
revealed association of a forecaster’s predictions with simple momentum rules, and it can be easily
compared with the self-assessed preferences of forecasting tools by the respective forecaster i: in
this vein, Table 5 summarizes the correlation coefficients of SHAREDDi with the percentage figure
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attributed by i to fundamental and technical analysis, respectively.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5, Panel A, shows that SHAREDDi decreases with the preference for fundamental analysis,
and increases with the preference for technical analysis. As the correlation coefficients decrease
in absolute value for trend periods longer than 30 days, we conclude that the distinction between
chartists and fundamentalists is particularly pronounced for shorter trend periods, i.e. trends which
are not necessarily well explained by fundamentals. Table 6 compares the average SHAREDD for
the groups of chartists and fundamentalists.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 6, Panel A, reconfirms that the association of individual forecasts with the extrapolation of
trends tends to be higher among chartists, and lower among fundamentalists. The t-test comparing
these two groups indicates that this difference is significant, at least as far as the trends on a 10,
30 or 60-day horizon are concerned. On the basis of simple technical rules, these findings overall
demonstrate that revealed trend-following and the stated preference for technical analysis is closely
linked. This result does not only confirm Hypothesis 1, but also ultimately underlines the credibility
of the self-assessment in the special surveys.
While the results above on average hold across prevailing trends of different sizes (which also
includes very small past changes in exchange rates), we also take a closer look at how the average
SHARE30 evolves depending on different strengths of the trend. To do so, we sort the (absolute)
30-day trends into ten intervals according to deciles (i.e, the first interval including the periods
with only little movement of exchange rates and the tenth interval including the periods with
large exchange rate movements), and compute the average SHARE30 separately for each of these
intervals. Figure 1 displays the results for chartists and fundamentalists, respectively.
[Figure 1 about here]
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Figure 1 illustrates that (i) forecasters are more sensitive to momentum when past exchange rate
trends have been strong (we will discuss this idea in more depth in the next section) and that (ii)
the group of fundamentalists behaves differently from chartists and intermediates, as they remain
relatively unimpressed by momentum compared to the other groups: for chartists, SHARE30 is on
average 0.35 for the lowest interval, while it is 0.51 for the highest interval. In contrast, SHARE30
only rises to 0.44 for the group of fundamentalists.
PPP orientation. The purchasing power parity is the most prominent fundamental concept
in theoretical exchange rate determination, in particular at horizons of six months and longer
(see Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Cheung, Chinn, and Marsh, 2004), and hence, we investigate to
what extent chartists and fundamentalists make use of this idea when predicting exchange rates.
We do not find that PPP orientation is more pronounced for fundamentalists (see our Hypothesis
2 ), but we are able to demonstrate that PPP orientation increases non-linearly with increasing
fundamental misalignment.
To determine whether or not an exchange rate is in line with fundamentals, we consider the
real exchange rate
qt = st + ln(CPI
EUR
t )− ln(CPIUSt ) (3)
and compute, for each point in time t, the average real exchange rate q¯t over the previous 10 years.
A forecast with PPP orientation is then made on the basis of
E∆st,t+k = φ
(PPP )(q¯t − qt) with φ(PPP ) > 0 (4)
Similarly to the measure SHAREDDt introduced in Eq. (2), we summarize the degree to which
the FX forecasts of an individual forecaster i are in line with PPP orientation by computing the
percentage share of forecasts made into the same direction as the forecast made by Eq. (4), i.e.
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SHAREPPPi =
number of forecasts by i in line with PPP orientation
number of all forecasts by i
(5)
Table 5 and 6 (in both tables: Panel B) inform about the relative importance of PPP orientation for
the considered groups. The correlation coefficient between SHAREDDi and the stated preference for
fundamental (or technical) analysis is not significantly different from zero. Moreover, on average,
33 percent of all forecasts made by chartists and fundamentalists are made into the direction which
can be interpreted as being in line with PPP orientation, which does not reveal any meaningful
difference between chartists and fundamentalists (see also Cheung, Chinn, and Marsh, 2004). One
reason for this result may be the fact that fundamentalists consider economic fundamentals in
more complex ways than assumed here for the sake of simplicity.
To see how PPP orientation differs depending on the degree of fundamental misalignment, we
sort the periods of survey responses into ten intervals according to the deciles of the absolute size
of |q¯t − qt|, and present the averages separately for each of these intervals in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows that the orientation at PPP (SHAREPPP ) dramatically increases from 0.33 to
0.57 (for intermediates) with increasing misalignment of interest rates. This holds qualitatively
true for chartists, intermediates, and fundamentalists. For fundamentalists, this effect appears to
be slightly more pronounced, as the average SHAREPPP even increases from 0.27 to 0.63. Overall,
the steep increase of SHAREPPP in the five upper deciles is consistent with the view of a non-linear
influence of PPP on exchange rate movements (e.g., Taylor, Peel, and Sarno, 2001). The fact that
all groups of forecasters exhibit similar behavior in that respect (with only a gradual difference
between chartists and fundamentalists) underlines that fundamental analysis is well present in the
information set of our group of chartists, a result which again reconfirms the stated preferences by
this group.
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4.2 Results on forecasting dynamics
This section looks at changes in forecasting behavior in two ways. First, we analyze the probability
of professionals to switch the direction of their exchange rate expectations. Second, we analyze
transitions from chartist to fundamentalist behavior (and reverse) by studying the dynamics of the
proportion of forecasts in our panel that are in line with trend-following behavior (as a measure of
chartist behavior).
Forecasting instability. It is frequently believed that technical traders typically provide less
stable predictions than fundamentalists (see our Hypothesis 3 ). Agent based models (e.g., by
Brock and Hommes, 1998; Farmer and Joshi, 2002; Westerhoff, 2004) adopt this view in their
modeling assumptions, such that it is typically a group of ”chartists” which - due to its changes in
expectations and thus trading positions - is responsible for volatility in the markets. As we discuss
below in more detail, our evidence supports this idea.
We measure the switching probability of an individual forecaster by the relative frequency
with which a forecaster changes the direction of his USD/EUR forecast within two subsequent
survey months, i.e. we count the number of such switches from a depreciation to an appreciation
expectation or inversely, and divide it by the number of total possible switches. In a cross-sectional
comparison, it becomes apparent that the switching probability is negatively correlated to the
stated use of fundamental information, and positively correlated to the stated use of technical
information (see Table 7, Panel A).
[Table 7 about here]
In addition, Table 7, Panel B, reports the cross-sectional averages of the individual switching
probabilities for chartists and fundamentalists, respectively. It shows that the individual switch-
ing probabilities are, on average, about 14 percent for chartists, but only about 9 percent for
fundamentalists.
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These probability figures refer to month-to-month changes, and the impact of their difference
becomes more visible when translated into probabilities of changes in an annual perspective (see
Figure 3): based on a binomial distribution where p equals the monthly switching probability, the
probability of no change (only one change or less) in forecasts over the course of one year declines
from 0.32 (0.71) for chartists to 0.17 (0.49) for fundamentalists. This pattern reconfirms that
chartists tend to switch more frequently from a long to a short position forecast and vice versa
than fundamentalists, which lends support to Hypothesis 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
Explaining the dynamics. The change of expectations may be induced by a switch of strate-
gies, e.g by shifts from fundamental to chartist strategies or reverse. Reasons for such shifts are
at the core of our Hypotheses 4 and 5. This paragraph describes the dynamics of the forecasters’
alignment with trend-following forecasting.
In particular, we reconsider the chartist forecasting rule introduced by Eq. (1). Unlike in our
analysis above, we now concentrate on the time series dimension and compute, for each period,
the proportion of forecasts in the panel of forecasters which points into the same direction as the
30-day chartists forecasting rule, i.e.
SHARE30t =
number of forecasters in period t in line with trend-following strategy
number of all forecasters in period t
(6)
Figure 4 illustrates how this proportion fluctuates over time, separately for the groups of chartists
and fundamentalists. The two graphs show that there are substantial short-term fluctuations
in these proportions; it can also be seen that the dynamics are similar, albeit not identical, for
chartists and fundamentalists.
[Figure 4 about here]
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In the following paragraphs, we investigate external circumstances influencing forecasters’ de-
cisions to turn to chartist forecasting rules, i.e. the factors determining changes in the proportion
of forecasts in line with trend-following forecasting rules, by time series regressions of the type
∆SHARE30t = a0 + a1∆SHARE
30
t−1 + a2∆Xt + et (7)
∆SHARE30t denotes the change in the proportion of forecasts made in t which point into the same
direction as a trading rule following the trend over the previous 30 days, ∆SHARE30t−1 a lagged
dependent variable and ∆Xt represents the changes in several control variables. These control
variables are discussed in more detail below. Due to potential overlaps (the forecasts are made
on a six-month horizon, whereas we sample at monthly frequency), we use Newey-West standard
errors with a lag length of five months.
Switching due to success of past momentum strategies. Based on the framework outlined
above, we test whether the proportion of forecasters who make use of trend-following strategies
reacts to the past performance of such strategies (our Hypothesis 4 ). We find evidence in favor of
this idea.
In our main operationalization, we assume that investors look back at the previous month’s ex-
change rate movements, and interpret the presence of a strong trend as a signal for the profitability
of momentum strategies (ignoring that following a momentum strategy could also lead to losses).
This approach (an investment into the currency which has ex post appreciated in the previous 30
days) can be formalized by
r
expost(30)
t = |f1t−1 − st| (8)
where f1t−1 and st represent the (log) forward and spot rates in t− 1 and t, respectively.
We include changes in returns, i.e. ∆r
expost(30)
t = r
expost(30)
t − rexpost(30)t−1 into the regression
equation (7) as a variable of interest; we refer to changes in returns between two months because
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we want to explain changes in the share of participants following trends also over two months.
Given the idea of our Hypothesis 4, we expect to find significantly positive coefficients. Table 8,
(i), displays the results.
[Table 8 about here]
It transpires that the coefficients for ∆r
expost(30)
t are statistically significantly positive at the
one-percent significance level. The adj. R2 amounts to 18.5 percent, which is higher than the 11.8
percent obtained by (unreported) pure AR(1) regressions. Hence, the inclusion of past returns
adds explanatory power. This result demonstrates that forecasters indeed take into account the
size of the most recent trends, and switch to chartist rules after relatively large trends. In fact,
the described relationship is also economically significant: when the change in the return from
holding the appreciating currency amounts to 2.1 percentage points (which corresponds to one
standard deviation of ∆rexpostt ), the percentage share of survey participants who follow chartist
strategies increases by an average of 5.4 percentage points, which corresponds to 35 percent of the
standard deviation of monthly changes of that proportion. Overall, forecasters tend to enter the
camp of chartists directly after large trends and they do not wait another month to see whether
the adoption of a momentum strategy has been profitable in the preceding period.
One caveat has to be expressed, however. For a stricter interpretation of Hypothesis 4, one
could also assume that forecasters observe very closely if a past momentum strategy -which has
been chosen based on the information set a period ago- has been profitable, or if it has led to losses
(a possibility which we have ignored in our approach above). Here, the profitability which matters
is the most recent monthly return of an investment decision which was made one month earlier
according to Eq. (1) based on the trend observed at that time, i.e.,
rTR30t = It−1(st−1 > E
(1)
t−1[st])(f
1
t−1 − st) + It−1(st−1 < E(1)t−1[st])(st − f1t−1) (9)
where It−1 is an indicator variable for a decision made in the previous period and E
(1)
t−1[st] represents
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the forecast made on the basis of Eq. (1). When we include ∆rTR30t = r
TR30
t − rTR30t−1 on the RHS
of Eq. (7), the coefficient for ∆rTR30t is not significantly different from zero (see Table 8, (ii)).
Thus, according to this result it is not the behavior described in Eq. (9) which drives forecasting
dynamics. Our findings rather indicate that forecasters adopt chartist rules when the presence of
trends suggests it might be profitable to follow them.
Switching due to deviations from fundamentals. Most chartist-fundamentalist models with
switching behavior imply that chartist strategies become less important when exchange rates de-
viate substantially from fundamentals (Hypothesis 5 ). We confirm this assumption on the basis
of our data; in particular, our findings corroborate the non-linearity of this relationship which is
frequently included in these models.
To illustrate this point, we consider the real exchange rate to be misaligned when its deviation
from the average value, i.e. |qt− q¯t| (see Eq. (3)) is high. As several exchange rate models suggest
that the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rate is non-linear (Dumas, 1993; Taylor,
Peel, and Sarno, 2001; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000), we also consider the squared distance |qt− q¯t|2,
which gives stronger weight to observations for which the misalignments are more pronounced. In
particular, in the framework of the time series regression as in Eq. (7), we analyze whether shocks
to these deviations (∆|qt− q¯t|) or squared deviations (∆|qt− q¯t|2) exert influence on the change of
the use of chartist rules.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 8, (iii) and (iv), displays the results. The coefficient for ∆|qt − q¯t| is negative, but not
significantly different from zero, indicating that the absolute deviation between fundamental values
and exchange rate rules does not affect the use of chartist rules. In contrast, the coefficient for
∆|qt−q¯t|2 is significantly smaller than zero, which indicates that shocks to the deviation of exchange
rates from fundamental values do matter when the deviation is substantially large. This result is
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in line with the earlier finding in Menkhoff, Rebitzky, and Schro¨der (2008) which is derived by a
different method.
It is worth noting that these results do not depend on the way we compute qt and q¯t. We also
consider the fundamental value to simply be represented by the moving average of the exchange
rate over the previous ten years, and impose that exchange rates are assumed to mean-revert when
they have deviated from this value. The results we find when measuring the deviation by |st − s¯t|
or |st − s¯t|2 respectively, are very similar.
Overall, this picture is in line with the notion of non-linearity of the relationship between
exchange rates and fundamentals, and confirms our Hypothesis 5, albeit with the restriction that
only pronounced misalignments will have a (negative) impact on the adoption of chartist rules.
Dynamics under high or low fundamental misalignment. To look more into the details of
the non-linear influence of fundamental misalignment on the forecasting dynamics, we reconsider
our Hypotheses 4 and 5 and analyze the influence of ∆r
expost(30)
t and ∆|qt − q¯t| on forecasting
behavior under different conditions. More specifically, we distinguish states with high and low
deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental value. We find the effects of our Hypothesis 4
(switch to trend-following after good performance in the recent past) to be particularly pronounced
when fundamental misalignment is low, whereas the effects of our Hypothesis 5 (fundamental
misalignment reduces trend-following) are only valid when fundamental misalignment is large.
For this analysis, we classify all periods in which |qt− q¯t| is smaller than its median X50(|qt− q¯t|)
as low deviations states, and the periods with |qt − q¯t| > X50(|qt − q¯t|) as high deviations states.
We estimate the dynamic relationship in Eq. (7) for both states separately, i.e.,
∆SHARE30t =

a01 + a11∆SHARE
30
t−1 + a21∆Xt + et if |qt − q¯t| < X50(|qt − q¯t|)
a02 + a12∆SHARE
30
t−1 + a22∆Xt + et if |qt − q¯t| > X50(|qt − q¯t|)
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As covariates, we consider the change in the absolute return of a momentum strategy over the last
30 days, ∆r
expost(30)
t , as well as the change in the deviation from PPP, ∆|qt − q¯t|. Table 9, Panel
A, displays the results.
[Table 9 about here]
Table 9, (i) and (iv), show that the coefficient for ∆r
expost(30)
t is not significantly different
from zero at any conventional significant levels in the high deviation states, whereas it is strongly
significant at the 1% level in the low deviation states. The economic significance of the estimates
points into the same direction: as can be derived from Panel B, an increase of ∆r
expost(30)
t by one
standard deviation in the low (high) deviation states leads to an increase of ∆SHARE30t by more
than one third (less than one forth) standard deviation. Thus, the effects of our Hypothesis 4
matter more when fundamental misalignment is small.
Unexpectedly, Table 9, specification (ii), demonstrates that ∆|qt − q¯t| carries even a positive
sign for the low deviation states, although without contributing too much to explanatory power.
Reassuringly, specification (iv) shows a negative sign of ∆|qt − q¯t| for the high deviation states.
For the latter, the R2 of the corresponding specification is much large than for the former. This
sign-switching pattern explains why ∆|qt − q¯t| does not enter significantly in our analysis in the
previous paragraph (see Table 8), and why only ∆|qt − q¯t|2 reveal the effects as postulated by our
Hypothesis 5. Thus, changes in fundamental misalignment only determine the forecasters’ behavior
when the level of fundamental misalignment is already large - a notion which corresponds to the
non-linear relationship in many models.
Switching of chartists and fundamentalists. In this paragraph, we only consider those
forecasters who have been classified as fundamentalists and chartists, respectively, and compute
∆SHARE30t for these two groups separately. We then conduct the regressions introduced by Eq.
(7). Table 10 present the results for chartists and fundamentalists, respectively.
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[Table 10 about here]
Overall, the time series analysis based on these two groups reconfirms the findings made above:
both groups tend to adopt chartist forecasting roles when the observed trends have increased
in the previous months, and tend to abandon these rules when fundamental misalignments are
pronounced. The negative coefficient for the AR(1) term is more pronounced for chartists than
for fundamentalists, which reconfirms that chartists switch their strategies more frequently than
fundamentalists. This observation is also in line with the chartists’ self-assessment that they
additionally rely on alternative approaches. Moreover, the negative coefficient of the squared
distance from the PPP value is more pronounced for fundamentalists, indicating that this group is
particularly sensitive to severe misalignments of the exchange rate to its fundamental value. This
finding is also in line with intuition.
4.3 Results on forecasting performance
As discussed above, the profitability of chartists’ and fundamentalists’ predictions is controversial.
We investigate whether both chartist and fundamentalist investors can survive in the market, i.e.
whether none of our groups is superior in terms of forecasting performance (our Hypothesis 6 ).
We illustrate that this holds generally true, albeit chartists appear to be rather superior as far as
very short horizons are concerned.
In order to assess the performance of forecasters we use two measures. First, we compute the
average return of a trading strategy for each individual forecaster’s FX predictions. Second, we
take the same data as input but use a risk-adjustment, here the Sharpe ratio. Both ideas imply
that the forecaster targets an investment into a currency on a fixed horizon (either holding a long
or a short position), and we thus measure trading performance with these measures.3
For both measures, we follow the concept introduced in Dick, MacDonald, and Menkhoff (2011)
3In the later robustness Section 5, we also compute absolute average forecast errors for each forecaster.
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and translate the individual forecasts into trading strategies, going long USD (in the forward
market) when they expect the USD to appreciate, and short when they expect the opposite. Each
position will be closed in the spot market at the end of the investment period of k months. As the
forecasters are asked to provide a six-month-ahead forecast, it is natural to focus on investments
with a six-months-horizon (k = 6), but we will in addition also consider different investment
horizons, i.e. one-, two-, three-, twelve-, 24, and 36-month horizons. Formally, the trading rule is
given by
r
TRIND,k
t,t+k = It(st > E
(IND)
t [st+k])(ft,k − st+k) + It(st < E(IND)t [st+k])(st+k − ft,k) (10)
where st denotes the log exchange rate of one Euro expressed in USD in month t, ft,k denotes the log
k-month forward rate in month t and E
(IND)
t represents an individual expectation of forecaster i.
For each forecaster, we compute the average monthly return of such trading strategies over time as
well as the annualized Sharpe ratios. Table 11 shows the averages for the groups of fundamentalists
and chartists, respectively.
[Table 11 about here]
Taking first a look at investments with a six-month horizon, it becomes apparent that chartists
and fundamentalists are not systematically different in terms of their forecasting performance:
chartists are slightly superior in terms of average returns (Panel A), whereas fundamentalists
exhibit slightly larger Sharpe ratios (Panel B), but these findings are far from being significantly
different. Note that the annualized average Sharpe ratio is not impressive for any of these two
groups, and given the fact that we have not taken transaction costs into account, our results do not
indicate that it is profitable to trade according to the average chartist’s or average fundamentalist’s
implicit trading rule.
This latter result does not change when we take investment horizons into consideration which
are different from six months. However, we do observe gradual changes in the relative average
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performance of chartists and fundamentalists: in fact, Table 11 suggests that chartists’ forecasts
lead to more profitable trading strategies than fundamentalists’ forecasts when their forecasts are
translated into investments on the one-month-horizon. The average monthly returns are 0.21
percent on average for chartists, and only 0.06 percent for fundamentalists; the Sharpe ratios
amount to 0.25 for chartists compared to 0.06 for fundamentalists. The significance of the difference
is more pronounced for average returns than for Sharpe ratios, but chartists are also superior
according to the latter criterion at least at the ten-percent significance level. On a two-month
horizon, the average returns based on FX predictions of chartists are also significantly superior to
those based on predictions made by fundamentalists; however, the corresponding difference is not
significant any more as far as Sharpe ratios are concerned. For investments at horizons longer than
two months, we do not find significant differences between the forecasting performance of chartists
and fundamentalists.
Overall, it is apparent that chartists perform significantly better than fundamentalists at very
short horizon trading strategies. In contrast, the forecasts made by fundamentalists are somewhat
better suited to make predictions at intermediate- and long-term horizons than short term horizons,
which can be seen in the increasing Sharpe ratios for this group. Our findings corroborate the idea
that fundamentalists and chartists forecast on different horizons (e.g. Taylor and Allen, 1992), and
it is thus perceivable that fundamentalists might be rather long-term oriented investors and their
forecasts may not be meant to be evaluated at short-term horizons such as one month. For longer
horizons, in contrast, fundamentalists and chartists appear to be comparably profitable, which
supports Hypothesis 6 and underlines the efficiency of FX markets in this important respect.
5 Robustness
This section informs about several robustness tests we have performed; they do not qualitatively
affect our findings. (i) We test whether our result on the importance of trends and deviation from
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PPP for expectation formation is robust to the possibility that forecasters follow a PPP strategy
or a carry trade strategy. Furthermore, we test whether the results hold when (ii) controlling for
volatility and (iii) without including the autoregressive term in Eq. (7). (iv) Finally, we test the
robustness of our approach by substituting the trading strategy as a measure of performance by a
measure of forecast accuracy.
Controlling for alternative trading rules. So far and throughout this study, our LHS variable
in Eq. (7) corresponds to the change in the share of forecasters which are in line with a forecast
based on a momentum-following forecasting rule. However, it has to be noted that a forecast, while
being in line with a particular rule, is nevertheless not with certainty based on that particular rule.
In this paragraph we address the possibility that forecasters have made their forecasts on a different,
i.e. PPP-oriented trading rule or carry trade rule.
To ensure that our results in the main part are not driven by the coincidence between the pre-
dictions from alternative rules, we consider both a forecasting rule based on fundamental analysis,
i.e. a rule presented expecting mean-reversion to PPP, and a carry-trade-based forecasting rule.4
We compute the proportion of forecasters whose forecasts are in line with those strategies, i.e.
SHAREPPPt and SHARE
CT
t . We then include ∆SHARE
PPP
t and ∆SHARE
CT
t as control variables
into the regression in Eq. (7).
Table 8, (vi), displays the results of this specification, and reveals that, in fact, the coefficient
for ∆SHAREPPPt is positive and significant at the five-percent level. Thus, in our sample, there
appears to be a slight tendency for momentum rules and fundamental rules to point into the same
direction. Importantly, however, the inclusion of these control variables does not alter any of the
other coefficients in a substantial way. Overall, the main results for our Hypotheses 4 and 5 are
also confirmed in this setting.
4The PPP rule follows the concept from Eq. (4), whereas the carry trade rule is given by
E[∆st,t+k] = φ
(k,CT )(iEURt − iUSt ) with φ(k,CT ) > 0
with iEURt and i
US
t representing the 3-month-interbank rates in the Eurozone and the United States, respectively.
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Controlling for volatility. We also test whether our results in Section 4.2 hold when we control
for volatility. A positive association between turbulence in markets and the use of chartist rules
has been postulated by, e.g., De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). More specifically, we compute
the standard deviation of daily returns during the 30 days before an individual forecast has been
made, and take the cross-sectional mean of these values for each survey period t, henceforth σ
(30)
t .
A survey period characterized by high average volatility measures is interpreted to be particularly
turbulent, and we consider changes in volatility ∆σ
(30)
t as a variable of interest in our regression
Eq. (7).
As Table 8, (vii), shows, the coefficient for ∆σ
(30)
t is not significantly different from zero; in
addition, the results from the main part remain virtually unchanged. This result also holds when
we compute volatility over different horizons (10 days or 90 days), or when we include the variance
instead of the standard deviation as a measure of volatility (unreported).
Ignoring the autoregressive term. So far, we have studied the dynamics of joining or aban-
doning trend-following forecasting by considering Eq. (7), which captures a lagged dependent
variable. As a robustness check, we also reconsider the dynamics with a specification without an
AR(1) term, i.e.,
∆SHARE30t = a0 + a2∆Xt + et (11)
Table 12 presents the results and reconfirms that increases in trend size lead to an increased
fraction of professionals with forecasts in line with momentum strategies. It also underlines that
this fraction decreases when the squared distance from the fundamental value increases. Our
conclusions from the main part with respect to Hypotheses 4 and 5 do thus not depend on the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable into the time series regressions.
[Table 12 about here]
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Forecast errors. To illustrate that the results of our discussion of Hypothesis 6 are not driven
by the way how we formulate trading strategies, we also apply an entirely different concept and
compute the individual forecasters’ average absolute forecast errors.
To do so, the directional forecasts (e.g., the USD appreciates, stagnates, depreciates) are coded
for simplicity in Xei,t+k = {−1, 0, 1}. Likewise, the realizations (ex post changes of exchange rates)
are also categorized into three corresponding groups. For the neutral (no-change) category, we
choose symmetric threshold values such that, over the entire time span, the share of observations
in the no-change category for realizations is as large as the share of forecasts in this category. Thus,
the thresholds differ according to the forecasting horizon.5 It has to be noted that forecasters can
be mistaken to two different extents: they make a small error when they predict an unchanged
variable, whereas the actual outcome is an increase, but a large error if they predict a decline. We
take this into account by computing absolute forecast errors by ||ei,t+k = |Xei,t,t+k −Xt,t+k|, which
takes on the value of 2 for a severe error, 1 for a small error and 0 for a correct prediction. Table
13 presents the average absolute forecast errors for the groups of chartists and fundamentalists.
[Table 13 about here]
Table 13 shows very similar results as our findings in the main part, which confirms that
our support for Hypothesis 6 is not driven by the choice of the trading strategy discussed above:
chartists commit less (and less severe) forecast errors on one-month horizons. In contrast, there are
no significant differences between chartists and fundamentalists when the forecasts are interpreted
with respect to their predictability on longer horizons.
5The neutral category is chosen for one-month changes within the range of -1.19 percent and +1.19 percent, two-
month changes between +/- 1.7 percent, three-month changes between +/-2 percent, six-month changes between
+/- 4 percent, twelve-month changes between +/- 6.455 percent, 24-month-changes between +/- 5.7 percent, and
36-month-changes between +/- 8.85 percent.
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6 Conclusions
The formation of exchange rates, and thus the formation of respective expectations, is a complex
phenomenon as the limited understanding of this process indicates. One root of complexity is the
existence of quite heterogeneous agents, in particular their reliance on either ”charts” or ”funda-
mentals” when forming expectations. There is ample evidence showing that these two forms of
analysis are indeed of great importance for practitioners (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). This has
been a motivation to construct models of heterogeneous agents in foreign exchange markets relying
on these two forms of analysis. The resulting interplay of chartists and fundamentalists provides
useful stylized facts. However, models of this kind rely on plausible but rather untested assump-
tions about the behavior of heterogeneous agents in foreign exchange. This study provides novel
evidence about the role of chartists and fundamentalists in the process of exchange rate formation.
We provide clear support for the core assumptions of chartist-fundamentalist models, such as
formulated by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), Bauer, De Grauwe, and Reitz (2009) or Dieci
and Westerhoff (2010). In particular, we find that (1) chartists and fundamentalists do indeed
form different exchange rate expectations; chartists’ expectations are more in line with trends
while fundamentalists consider mean reversion slightly more. (2) Chartists change their forecast
direction more often than fundamentalists and in this sense contribute to instability. However,
despite the differences between chartists and fundamentalists, there are strong common changes
in expectations, in particular when exchange rates deviate strongly from long-run averages. (3)
Chartists’ exchange rate expectations are as good as fundamentalists’ or the market average, and
they are even better at short horizons, so that chartists can survive in the market. This does not
support the conventional understanding of efficient financial markets, as described in Fama (1991).
All these findings are derived from a new perspective clearly supporting the appropriateness of
the chartist-fundamentalist model in foreign exchange. This research is the first - to the best of our
knowledge - to systematically link data about expectation formation with self-stated preferences
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for charts or fundamentals. We thus provide more direct evidence on chartist-fundamentalist
approaches than earlier studies, which rely on either only parts of this information (exchange rate
expectations or the use of analytical tools), or on simulations of artificial markets or on experiments.
Nevertheless, some caveats remain: Regarding our research, the evidence is based on forecasters
who are not themselves investors, so that answers may be biased, e.g., favoring longer horizons
than foreign exchange traders. Regarding the chartist-fundamentalist models, these are highly
stylized and reduce market behavior in drastic ways: e.g., chartist behavior is more than trend-
following and fundamental behavior reaches beyond PPP-orientation. This may be considered
more explicitly in future research.
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Table 1: Weighting of forecasting tools
This table reports the self-assessment of professional forecasters with respect to their preferred
forecasting tools. In special surveys in 2004/01, 2007/04, and 2011/09 the forecasters are asked to
attach weights to technical analysis (Tech.), fundamentalist analysis (Fund.) and the analysis of
order flow (OF), depending on their usage of these techniques for their FX predictions. This table
reports the cross-sectional mean as well as the standard deviation of these figures.
Jan 2004 April 2007 Sept. 2011
Fund. Tech. OF Fund. Tech. OF Fund. Tech. OF
Mean 60.0 29.9 10.1 57.6 28.6 13.8 57.4 27.4 15.2
SD 21.6 19.8 11.9 20.3 17.1 12.7 22.0 18.0 14.1
N 237 237 237 247 247 247 198 198 198
Table 2: Groups
This table reports characteristics of the defined groups of fundamentalists, chartists, and inter-
mediates. Based on the self-assessed usage of forecasting tools in the special surveys, we classify
forecasters as chartists when they put a stronger weight on chartist than on fundamental informa-
tion, unless the weight on chartist information is below 40 percent. To keep groups similarly large,
we define forecasters to be fundamentalists when they attach a weight of at least 80 percent to
fundamental analysis. The table displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum
weight (in percent) for fundamental and technical analysis, respectively, for all groups separately.
Fundamental analysis Technical analysis
N Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
fundamentalists 65 88.8 8.4 80.0 100.0 7.2 7.7 0.0 20.0
intermediates 271 58.3 12.1 20.0 78.3 27.3 10.3 0.0 50.0
chartists 60 30.4 10.3 0.0 45.0 55.8 11.7 40.0 92.5
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Table 3: Changes of preferences over time
These tables illustrate how preferences with respect to forecasting tools (fundamental or technical
analysis) change over time. We use the identical classification rules described in Table 2 for each of
the three special surveys separately and consider those forecasters who have responded to at least
two of these. The contingency tables show the transition of forecasters w.r.t. these groups from one
special survey to another one (Panel A: from April 2007 to Sept. 2011; Panel B: from Jan. 2004
to Sept. 2011). The figures in the tables refer to the number of forecasters. The Pearson X2 tests
against the H0 that the classification of a forecaster based on one special survey is independent
from the classification in the other special survey. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% significance level).
Panel A Apr. 2007
fundamentalists intermediates chartists Σ
fundamentalists 14 15 1 30
Sept. 2011 intermediates 8 68 6 82
chartists 0 14 9 23
Σ 22 97 16 135
Pearson X24 ***44.36
Panel B Jan. 2004
fundamentalists intermediates chartists Σ
fundamentalists 12 8 1 21
Sept. 2011 intermediates 11 39 8 58
chartists 2 5 7 14
Σ 25 52 16 93
Pearson X24 ***23.92
Table 4: Comparing panelists with all forecasters
This table compares the forecasts issued by the analysts considered in this study (panelists: the 396
forecasters who have also responded to special questions about their preferred forecasting tools)
with all 744 forecasters in the dataset (all forecasters). (Both groups only include the forecasters
with at least 10 survey responses.) For each point in time, we compute the proportion of forecasters
(for both groups separately) who predict an appreciation, no-change, and a depreciation of the
USD against the Euro. The means and standard deviations (over time) of these proportions are
compared in this table. The table also reports the mean of the absolute difference as well as the
Pearson correlation coefficient of the time series of proportions for both panelists and all forecasters.
Apprec. of USD No-change Deprec. of USD
N Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Panelists 396 0.219 0.116 0.290 0.059 0.490 0.137
All forecasters 744 0.220 0.116 0.295 0.062 0.485 0.138
Mean of absolute differences 0.011 0.013 0.014
Correlation 0.993 0.958 0.991
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Table 5: Self-assessment and revealed behavior, correlations
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Panel A shows the correlation of the individual
percentage share of forecasts made in line with the momentum strategy SHAREDDi (where DD
denotes the days of the considered trend, i.e. 10, 30, 60, 90, and 180 days) with the individual
survey response about the weights (in percent) attributed to fundamental and technical analysis,
respectively. Panel B shows the correlation of the individual percentage share of forecasts made in
line with the PPP with the individual survey response about the weights (in percent) attributed
to fundamental and technical analysis, respectively. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% significance level).
Panel A Panel B
SHARE10i SHARE
30
i SHARE
60
i SHARE
90
i SHARE
180
i SHARE
PPP
i
fund. analysis (in %) ***-0.14 ***-0.16 ***-0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08
techn. analysis (in %) *0.11 **0.12 *0.09 0.03 0.01 0.08
Table 6: Revealed behavior for different groups, averages
Panel A reports the average individual percentage share of forecasts made in line with the mo-
mentum strategy SHAREDD (where DD denotes the days of the considered trend, i.e. 10, 30,
60, 90, and 180 days) for the groups of chartists, fundamentalists and intermediates. Panel B
reports the average individual percentage share of forecasts made in line with PPP. The last row
displays the results of t-statistic, where the H0 corresponds to equal means between chartists and
fundamentalists. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% significance level).
Panel A Panel B
SHARE10 SHARE30 SHARE60 SHARE90 SHARE180 SHAREPPP
fundamentalists 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.33
intermediates 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.35
chartists 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.33
t-test fund. vs. chart. **2.26 **2.54 **2.26 1.16 1.02 0.08
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Table 7: Switching probability, correlations and mean
Panel A reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the correlation of the individual probability
of switching the direction of an USD/EUR forecast from one month to the next with with the
individual survey response about the weights (in percent) attributed to fundamental and technical
analysis, respectively. Panel B reports the average individual probability of switching the direction
of an USD/EUR forecast from one month to the next for the groups of chartists, fundamentalists
and intermediates. The last row displays the results of t-statistic, where the H0 corresponds to
equal means between chartists and fundamentalists. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% significance level).
Panel A Correlation with switching probability
fundamental analysis (in %) ***-0.16
technical analysis (in %) ***0.16
Panel B Mean switching probability, by group
fundamentalists 0.09
intermediates 0.11
chartists 0.14
t-test fund. vs. chartists 2.35**
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Table 8: Explaining switching into momentum strategies, time series regressions
This table reports the results of a regression of the type
∆SHARE30t = a0 + a1∆SHARE
30
t−1 + a2∆Xt + et
where ∆SHARE30t denotes the change in the proportion of forecasts made in t which point into
the same direction as a trading rule following the trend over the previous 30 days, ∆SHARE30t−1
a lagged dependent variable and ∆Xt represents the changes in several control variables. These
control variables include the ex-post return of a strategy which has followed the trend of the
previous 30 days, r
expost(30)
t , the previous month’s return of a momentum-strategy chosen on the
basis of the trend the month before, r
TR(30)
t , the deviation of the real exchange rate from its moving
average of the preceding 10 years, |qt − q¯t|, and the square of this distance, (qt − q¯t)2. In addition,
we include ∆SHAREPPPt and ∆SHARE
CT
t , which denote the change in the proportion of forecasts
made in t which point into the same direction as a PPP-oriented (carry-trade oriented) forecast as
further control variables. Due to potential time overlaps (the forecasts are made on a six-month
horizon, whereas we sample at monthly frequency), we use Newey-West standard errors with a lag
length of five months. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
significance level).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
∆SHARE30t−1 -0.360 -0.347 -0.355 -0.387 -0.393 -0.398 -0.392
***(0.100) ***(0.106) ***(0.095) ***(0.090) ***(0.089) ***(0.083) ***(0.090)
∆r
expost(30)
t 2.709 2.716 2.516 2.706
***(0.959) ***(0.800) ***(0.832) ***(0.819)
∆r
TR(30)
t -0.333
(0.731)
∆|qt − q¯t| -0.819
(0.938)
∆(qt − q¯t)2 -5.885 -5.802 -5.865 -5.782
***(1.969) ***(1.967) ***(1.710) ***(1.910)
∆SHAREPPP 0.547
**(0.274)
∆SHARECT -0.065
(0.256)
σ(30) 0.287
(2.288)
const. -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
T 151 151 150 150 150 150 150
R2 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.28 0.31 0.28
adj. R2 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.28 0.26
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Table 9: PPP deviations and switching into momentum strategies
Taking the median as the threshold, we distinguish states with high and low deviation of the
exchange rate from the PPP-mean-reverting value |qt − q¯t|. In the following, ∆SHARE30t denotes
the change in the proportion of forecasts made in t which point into the same direction as a
trading rule following the trend over the previous 30 days, and ∆r
expost(30)
t denotes the change in
the ex-post return of a strategy which has followed the trend of the previous 30 days.
Similarly to the analysis in Table 8, we conduct time series regressions for the states of high or low
deviation separately, i.e.,
∆SHARE30t =
{
a01 + a11∆SHARE
30
t−1 + a21∆Xt + et if |qt − q¯t| < X50(|qt − q¯t|)
a02 + a12∆SHARE
30
t−1 + a22∆Xt + et if |qt − q¯t| > X50(|qt − q¯t|)
∆SHARE30t−1 is included as lagged dependent variable and ∆Xt represents the changes in the
control variables (i.e. ∆r
expost(30)
t and ∆|qt − q¯t|).
Panel A displays the estimates. Due to potential time overlaps (the forecasts are made on a six-
month horizon, whereas we sample at monthly frequency), we use Newey-West standard errors
with a lag length of five months. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. (***: 1%, **: 5%,
*: 10% significance level).
Lower PPP Deviation Higher PPP Deviation
Panel A (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
∆SHARE30t−1 -0.282 -0.310 -0.287 -0.395 -0.457 -0.470
***(0.052) ***(0.051) ***(0.058) ***(0.131) ***(0.098) ***(0.090)
∆r
expost(30)
t 2.344 2.141 3.306 3.110
***(0.734) ***(0.772) (2.119) *(1.566)
∆|qt − q¯t| 2.081 1.869 -4.352 -4.283
***(0.540) ***(0.445) ***(1.119) ***(1.135)
const. 0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.012 0.010
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
T 74 74 74 75 75 75
R2 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.20 0.36 0.41
adj. R2 0.19 0.21 0.29 0.18 0.34 0.38
Panel B shows the mean and standard deviation of ∆SHARE30, ∆r
expost(30)
t , and ∆|qt − q¯t| (i.e.
of the monthly changes of the introduced variables) for both states separately.
All Lower PPP Deviation Higher PPP Deviation
Panel B Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
∆SHARE30 -0.0004 0.2069 0.0014 0.1540 -0.0005 0.2500
∆r
expost(30)
t 0.0000 0.0206 -0.0006 0.0226 0.0003 0.0184
∆|qt − q¯t| 0.0004 0.0276 -0.0020 0.0284 -0.0027 0.0268
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Table 10: Explaining switching into momentum strategies, time series regressions by groups
This table reports the results of a regression of the type described in Table 8. The regressions are
conducted separately for chartists and fundamentalists. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% significance
level).
Fundamentalists Chartists
∆SHARE30 -0.385 -0.488
***(0.074) ***(0.068)
∆r
expost(30)
t 2.232 1.846
**(0.873) **(0.882)
∆|qt − q¯t|
∆(qt − q¯t)2 -6.433 -4.496
***(1.917) **(1.795)
∆SHAREPPP 0.324 -0.030
*(0.176) (0.171)
∆SHARECT -0.076 0.075
(0.179) (0.162)
const. 0.002 0.001
(0.010) (0.009)
T 150 150
R2 0.28 0.30
adj. R2 0.26 0.28
Table 11: Performance of trading rules, averages by groups
This table reports the cross-sectional averages (separately for fundamentalists, chartists and in-
termediates) of the average monthly return (Panel A) and the annualized Sharpe Ratio (Panel B)
from trading strategies based on individual forecasts. These trading strategies translate a appre-
ciation (depreciation) expectation into a long (short) position, taken in the forward market; the
positions will be closed k months later in the spot market. We consider investments on different
horizons, i.e. 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 24 and 36 months. The last row displays the results of t-statistic, where
the H0 corresponds to equal means between chartists and fundamentalists. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *:
10% significance level).
Panel A: average returns 1 mo 2 mo 3 mo 6 mo 12 mo 24 mo 36 mo
fundamentalists 0.06% 0.07% 0.10% 0.13% 0.08% 0.09% 0.07%
intermediates 0.17% 0.15% 0.12% 0.13% 0.09% 0.11% 0.10%
chartists 0.21% 0.18% 0.15% 0.14% 0.09% 0.10% 0.09%
t-values fund. vs. chart. **2.34 *1.81 0.94 0.44 0.56 0.45 0.56
Panel B: Sharpe Ratios 1 mo 2 mo 3 mo 6 mo 12 mo 24 mo 36 mo
fundamentalists 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.10 0.16 0.17
intermediates 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.17
chartists 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.16
t-values fund. vs. chart. **2.31 1.56 0.45 0.14 0.37 0.11 0.27
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Table 12: Explaining switching into momentum strategies, time series regressions, without au-
toregressive term
This table reports the results of a regression of the type
∆SHARE30t = a0 + +a1∆Xt + et
where ∆SHARE30t denotes the change in the proportion of forecasts made in t which point into the
same direction as a trading rule following the trend over the previous 30 days, and ∆Xt represents
the changes in several control variables. These control variables include the ex-post return of a
strategy which has followed the trend of the previous 30 days, r
expost(30)
t , the previous month’s
return of a momentum-strategy chosen on the basis of the trend the month before, r
TR(30)
t , the
deviation of the real exchange rate from its moving average of the preceding 10 years, |qt − q¯t|,
and the square of this distance, (qt− q¯t)2. In addition, we include ∆SHAREPPPt and ∆SHARECTt ,
which denote the change in the proportion of forecasts made in t which point into the same direction
as a PPP-oriented (carry-trade oriented) forecast as further control variables. Due to potential
time overlaps (the forecasts are made on a six-month horizon, whereas we sample at monthly
frequency), we use Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of five months. Standard errors
are provided in parentheses. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% significance level).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
∆r
expost(30)
t 2.526 2.568
***(0.868) ***(0.745)
∆r
TR(30)
t -0.637
-0.747
∆|qt − q¯t| -0.767
-0.881
∆(qt − q¯t)2 ***-5.039 ***-4.984
-1.782 -1.948
const. -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
-0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
T 151 151 151 151 150
R2 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.13
adj. R2 0.06 0 0 0.06 0.12
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Table 13: Performance of trading rules, average absolute forecast errors by groups
This table reports the cross sectional average (for fundamentalists, chartists, and intermediates)
of the average absolute forecast errors made by individual forecasters. We compare the forecasts
with realized changes on different horizons, i.e., 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 24, and 36 months. The last row
displays the results of t-statistic, where the H0 corresponds to equal means between chartists and
fundamentalists. (***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10% significance level).
Average absolute forecast error 1 mo 2 mo 3 mo 6 mo 12 mo 24 mo 36 mo
fundamentalists 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.81 0.83 0.70 0.67
intermediates 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.74 0.71
chartists 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.75 0.71
t-values fund. vs. chart. **2.10 1.46 0.60 0.10 0.55 1.12 1.00
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Figure 1: Observed momentum-following, depending on size of previous trends
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This plot represents a set of cross-sectional averages (for each fundamentalists, chartists, and inter-
mediates separately) of the proportion of individual forecasts which are in line with momentum-
following behavior (based on the trend observed in the last 30 days). The graph in this figure
illustrates the averages in dependence of the market phases, i.e. the absolute size of the trend of
the previous 30 days. The x-axis displays the intervals according to deciles (0.1 representing the
lowest 10 percent of observed trends (0-10%), 1 representing the highest 10 percent (90-100%)).
The y-axis represents the proportion of forecasts which are in line with momentum strategy (e.g.,
0.4 = 40%). The solid dark line represents the group of fundamentalists, the solid light line the
group of chartists, and the dotted line the group of intermediates.
Figure 2: Observed PPP-orientation, depending on size of fundamental misalignment
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This plot represents a set of cross-sectional averages (for each fundamentalists, chartists, and inter-
mediates separately) of the proportion of individual forecasts which are in line with PPP-oriented
behavior (based on the deviation of the real exchange rate from its 10-year moving average). The
graph in this figure illustrates the averages in dependence of the market phases, i.e. the absolute
deviation. The x-axis displays the intervals according to deciles (0.1 representing the lowest 10
percent of observed trends (0-10%), 1 representing the highest 10 percent (90-100%)). The y-axis
represents the proportion of forecasts which are in line with PPP orientation (e.g., 0.4 = 40%). The
solid dark line represents the group of fundamentalists, the solid light line the group of chartists,
and the dotted line the group of intermediates.
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Figure 3: Switching probability, illustration
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This plot represents the estimated average probability (on the y-axis) that fundamentalists and
chartists switch the direction of their forecast x times or less over the time span of one year, where
x is represented by the x-axis.
Figure 4: Proportion of forecasters in line with trend-following behavior
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This plot represents the proportion of forecasters whose forecasts are in line with a momentum-
following strategy which follows the trend of the previous 30 days. The graph plots separate lines
for fundamentalists and chartists, respectively.
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